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I. INTRODUCTION
No one can accuse Denise Bronsdon of not working hard or not risking
it all to achieve her dreams.' At age 50, she confronted her goals, and she
received a bachelor's degree in English from Wellesley College.2 After
graduating, she set her sights on law school and, in December 2005, Denise
graduated in the top half of her class at Southern New England School of Law.3
To finance her education, Denise, like many other law students, took out student
loans, totaling more than $82,000.
4
After graduation, Denise prepared and sat for the bar exam.5
Unfortunately, she failed her first exam by a significant margin.6 Unwilling to
give up, Denise studied again and sat for the bar exam a second time.7 Again, she
failed.8 Looking for the elusive "third time is a charm," Denise prepared and sat
a third time for the bar exam.9 Disappointingly, Denise failed again.
10
In what can be described as a law student's worst nightmare, Denise
Bronsdon found herself at age 64 with a law degree, no law license, no job, and
$82,000 in debt. 1 Single and without children, Denise owned no property and
lived in her father's home.' 2 With no hope to repay her debts, Denise filed a
The following fact pattern comes from Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 435 B.R.
791 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010).
2 Id. at 794.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
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bankruptcy petition in 2007.13 Denise also sought to discharge her student loan
obligations, arguing that her circumstances met the government's high bar for
bankruptcy discharge and qualified her loans as an "undue hardship" that, like
her other consumer debts, should be discharged and dissolved in the bankruptcy
proceedings. 14
The court, after analyzing Denise's "work history, narrow work
experience, failure to pass the bar exam, age, [and] unsuccessful attempts to find
employment in a variety of fields, [agreed that Denise] had no reasonably reliable
future financial resources other than [her] Social Security payments" and agreed
that Denise would suffer an undue hardship unless her debt was discharged.15
The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the First Circuit agreed.16
Denise was released from her debt and the reminder of her failure.
Today, there are more than 40 million people in the United States who
owe federal or private student loan debt, and the total debt is close to $1.2
trillion.17 America's "second largest consumer debt market" is the student loan
market, a market that has grown rapidly over the last decade. 18 Since the 1970s,
the discharge of student loan debt in bankruptcy has been strictly limited to those
borrowers in extreme circumstances. 19 Today's consumer market---one that is
increasingly skeptical of educational debts20-presents unique challenges to the
current student loan system. These challenges are even more acute given
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 795 (quoting In re Bronsdon, Bankr. No. 07-14215-JR, 2009 WL 95038, at *2-3
(Bankr. D. Mass. Jan. 13, 2009), vacated and remanded sub nom., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v.
Bronsdon, 421 B.R. 27 (D. Mass 2009)).
16 Id. at 804.
17 Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Launches Public Inquiry Into Student
Loan Servicing Practices (May 14, 2015), [hereinafter CFPB Launches Public Inquiry],
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-launches-public-inquiry-into-student-loan-
servicing-practices/.
18 Id.
19 Brendan Baker, Comment, Deeper Debt, Denial of Discharge: The Harsh Treatment of
Student Loan Debt in Bankruptcy: Recent Developments and Proposed Reforms, 14 U. PA. J. Bus.
L. 1213, 1214 (2012).
20 See, e.g., JOEL BEST & ERIC BEST, THE STUDENT LOAN MESS: How GOOD INTENTIONS
CREATED A TRILLION-DOLLAR PROBLEM (2014); ALAN MICHAEL COLLINGE, THE STUDENT LOAN
SCAM: THE MOST OPPREsSIvE DEBT IN U.S. HISTORY-AND How WE CAN FIGHT BACK (20 10).
2016]
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increasing reports of the improper servicing2' of student loans.22 Verified reports
of illegal servicing activity include improperly allocating payments in order to
maximize late fees, misrepresenting minimum payments, charging late fees that
violate the terms of the loan, providing inaccurate tax information, providing
misleading information about bankruptcy protections, and making illegal debt
collection calls that violate consumer protection standards.23 Given the high bar
imposed on student loan borrowers' discharge of student loans,24 reports of such
unconscionable servicing practices are increasingly worrisome for students and
regulators.
As a response to the 2008 mortgage crisis, state and federal consumer
advocates strengthened consumer laws, including adding and strengthening fee-
shifting statutes that encouraged and enabled student loan borrowers to challenge
the servicers of their mortgage loans.2 5 The concept of fee shifting originated in
the civil rights context to encourage litigation in the public interest.26 Fee-shifting
statutes function by allowing successful plaintiffs to recover their attorney's fees
from the defendants in their suits. 27 Fee-shifting provisions have expanded
beyond civil rights to other areas of the law as a way to provide attorneys with
the economic interest to litigate cases that would not otherwise provide sufficient
or reliable recovery.2 8
Ultimately, this Note will argue that the high bar that accompanies
student loan discharge in bankruptcy creates a vulnerable population of student
21 "Servicing" is the term used to describe the receipt of loan payments, the application of
payments to borrowers' accounts, maintenance of records, communication with borrowers, and
facilitation of default-prevention programs. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
STUDENT LOAN SERVICING: ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC INPUT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
(2015) [hereinafter 2015 REPORT], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509-cfpb-student-loan-
servicing-report.pdf.
22 In 2015, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") released a report on what it
termed "illegal servicing practices," or the "sloppy, patchwork practices that can create obstacles
to repayment, raise costs, cause distress, and contribute to driving struggling borrowers to default."
See 2015 REPORT, supra note 21, at 12. Servicers are the businesses that connect student borrowers
to the entities that hold their loans or originate them. Id. at 11. Servicers are different from lenders
or holders, which originate the loan capital or hold the note. Id. See infra Part II.C.3 for a more
detailed discussion of the 2015 Report.
23 Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Supervision Report Highlights Risky
Practices in Student Loan Servicing (Oct. 28, 2014),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-supervision-report-highlights-risky-practices-
in-student-loan-servicing/.
24 See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the elevated standard.
25 See infra Part II.D for a discussion of mortgage servicing reforms.
26 Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role ofAttorney Fee Shifting in Public Interest
Litigation, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 233 (1984),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3755&context=lcp.
27 Id. at 233.
28 Id.
[Vol. 119
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loan borrowers that are susceptible to frustrating and unconscionable loan
servicing practices, but through strong consumer protection measures, including
broadly-awarded fee-shifting provisions, this concern may be minimized.
Although regulators are investigating ways to increase borrower protections
through increased oversight, such provisions will not have adequate individual
impacts. Using the success of the mortgage servicing reforms as a guide, student
loan borrowers must have a method of individually challenging their student loan
servicers in the courts to achieve immediate and individual relief. In order to
completely protect borrowers, state consumer protection statutes must include
strong fee-shifting provisions that apply to student loan borrowers.
Part II of this Note outlines the history of student loans in the United
States, the undue burden standard on bankruptcy discharge, the current student
loan complaint process, and the key elements of mortgage crisis reform, which
provided independent relief. Next, Part III of this Note addresses the
shortcomings of the current student loan system and argues that increased
regulation must be accompanied by increased statutory protections and vehicles
for bringing independent claims for egregious servicing, including the
importance of fee-shifting statutes to encourage such claims. Lastly, this Note
concludes by examining the possibilities that could threaten the consumer market
if proper action is not taken.
II. BACKGROUND
The growth of America's student loan market has increased interest and
awareness of the issues and policies surrounding student loan debt. This part
offers a brief examination of some key issues related to student loans. Section A
explains the political environments and policies that gave way to the popularity
of student loans in America. Section B examines the prohibition on the discharge
of student loan debt in bankruptcy and the government's interests in securing
repayment. This section also examines the prohibition's evolution to its current
standard, requiring a showing of "undue burden," as well as judicial
interpretations of this term. Section C examines recent inquiries into the
servicing of student loans, growing reports of servicing abuses in this market,
and the current regulatory complaint process. Finally, Section D offers a brief
overview of mortgage reforms, including the particular effectiveness of fee-
shifting provisions.
A. Origins of the Student Loan System
Loans for post-secondary education became popular in the 1950s, an
effect of the Cold War and a response to fears that, without encouragement and
assistance, America would not be capable of challenging Russia's rocket
20161
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scientists. 29 These concerns led President Eisenhower to establish the nation's
first "low-interest college loan program through the National Defense Education
Act of 1958" ("Defense Act"). 30 In the mid-1960s, student loans grew again
under President Johnson's "Great Society" initiatives, part of the "war on
poverty. 31 Under that regime, the focus shifted from encouraging Russian
competition to improving the lives of the American poor through education and
social advancement.32 This shift was accompanied by new funding as well: rather
than being funded by the government, as under the Defense Act, President
Johnson's plan enabled banks to make loans to students, which were in turn
guaranteed by the government.33
In the 1970s, bankruptcy reforms established a high standard for the
discharge of student loan debt, which has remained substantively the same since
its enactment.34 At the same time, college tuition has increased dramatically,
jumping 439% from 1982 to 2006, and exceeding the average increase in family
income during that same period by 147%. 35 President Obama has recently
proposed revising the 40-year-old standards under which such loans can be
discharged,3 6 but some experts question whether the policy behind the treatment
of student loan debt merits enough deference to be revised.37 Some policymakers
believe that the entire education system merits a complete overhaul, 38 but that
topic is beyond the scope of this Note.
Discussions about the history of student loans should include the fact
that, with few exceptions, student loans are rarely dischargeable in bankruptcy,
a policy which grew from a "public[ly] perceived ... loophole in the student loan
29 Connie Cass, Student Loans 101: Why Uncle Sam Is Your Banker, HUFFINGTON POST (July
19, 2013, 9:46 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20130719/ap-us-student-loans-
banker-sam/.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Baker, supra note 19, at 1213.
35 Id.
36 Presidential Memorandum, The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Student Aid Bill of
Rights (Mar. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Presidential Memorandum], https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/03/10/presidential-memorandum-student-aid-bill-rights.
37 See, e.g., B.J. Huey, Comment, Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time Finally
Arrived for Congress to Discharge Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 34 TEx. TECH. L.
REv. 89 (2002).
38 See Barry Malone, Lawmakers Begin Taking on Student Loan Debt, STUDENT LAW. Nov.-
Dec. 2015, at 20-24; Betsy Mayotte, The Student Loan Ranger: Explore How Presidential
Candidates Stand on Student Loan Debt, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 28, 2015, 10:00 AM),
http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-ranger/2015/10/28/explore-how-
presidential-candidates-stand-on-student-loan-debt.
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programs that was subject to abuse. ' 39 This "public perce[ption]" was influenced
by the media and stories about a few students who did abuse the system,
discharging their debts to escape repayment and increase their earnings.4 °
Despite conflicting evidence regarding actual abuses of the student loan system
using bankruptcy, the 1970 Commission on Bankruptcy Laws ("Commission")
recommended restrictions on the discharge of student loans.41
Yet, when the General Accounting Office ("GAO") studied the levels of
student loan discharge abuse for Congress's consideration in Bankruptcy Code
provisions,42 the GAO determined that the abuse through bankruptcy discharge
was very rare and not problematic.43 The GAO determined that the high rate of
default for students who were actually paying back their education obligations
was a greater and more pressing concern. 44 Despite these findings, the
Commission still "recommended a restriction on the discharge of student
loans. 45 The Commission proposed that discharge of student loans should be
prohibited unless (1) loan repayment started at least five years before bankruptcy
filing, or (2) "repayment... would impose an 'undue hardship' on the
[borrower] .'46
Ultimately, Congress adopted the Commission's recommendations,47
including the five year and hardship exceptions recommended by the
Commission.48 In 1990, Congress further restricted the instances under which
students could discharge their loans by extending the prohibition to both Chapter
39 Huey, supra note 37, at 97.
40 Id. at 97-98 (citing for example Jean Seligman et al., Study Now, Pay Never, NEWSWEEK,
May 7, 1977, at 95).
41 Id. at 99 (citing REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 209 (1973); Thad Collins, Note, Forging Middle Ground: Revision of
Student Loan Debts in Bankruptcy as an Impetus to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), 75 IOWA L. REv.
733, 740 (1990)).
42 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 132-33 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6093-94).
43 Id. at 98. Huey notes that the GAO concluded that only one-half to three-quarters of a single
percent of educational loans were improperly discharged. See id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595,
132-33 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6093-94).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 98-99.
46 H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 140.
47 Huey, supra note 37, at 99. Huey notes that these provisions were included first in the
Education Amendments of 1976 and were later added to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See
also Education Amendments of 1976, PUB. L. No. 94-482, 90 Stat. 2081; Act of Nov. 6, 1978,
PUB. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2591, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000)).
48 Huey, supra note 37, at 100 (citing S. REP. No. 95-989, at 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865).
2016]
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7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings. 49 That same year, the Bankruptcy
Code was amended to lengthen the time exception from five to seven years. 50 In
1998, Congress eliminated any time-related exceptions to the prohibition on
discharge,51 tightening the law to its current form and firmly establishing
Congress's commitment to eliminate any loopholes through which students
could seek to avoid loan repayment.52 Congress's treatment of student loan
discharge is a high bar, but it is not an impossible one.53 The standard required
to successfully discharge student loan debt in bankruptcy is that of "undue
burden," a standard that courts have attempted to define and test for 40 years.
B. Limited Discharge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy
The statute that provides the limitations for discharging student loan debt
in bankruptcy is 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), which states that the grant of discharge
in bankruptcy proceedings "does not discharge an individual debtor from any
[student loan] debt" unless failing to grant the discharge would "impose an undue
hardship. 54 The statute provides that this limitation on discharge applies to three
types of student loan debts: (1) any overpayment or loan made, guaranteed, or
insured by the government, or funded by any government unit or nonprofit; (2)
"an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or
stipend;" and (3) any other education loan, incurred by an individual, and defined
in section by statute.55
The statute's prohibition, that student loan debt may not be discharged
unless the borrower would experience "undue hardship," has traditionally been
interpreted narrowly by courts, in accordance with Congress's desire to limit
discharge. The standard, which is not self-defining, has led to the development
of multiple tests to assist courts in evaluating which circumstances meet this
standard.56 Two tests in particular have become popular for courts deciding this
issue: (1) the Brunner test and (2) the totality-of-the-circumstances test.
49 Id.
50 Id. (citing Higher Education Amendments of 1998, PuB. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1837
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012))).
51 Id. at 101.
52 Id. at 101 (discussing loopholes present in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012)).
53 See supra notes 2-16 and Denise Bronsdon's story in Part I.
54 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 523(a)(8)(A)-(B) (2012).
55 Id. § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). A qualified education loan is defined as a loan taken "solely to pay
qualified higher education expenses" incurred (A) by the debtor, the debtor's spouse, or any
dependent during the relevant time period that is (B) incurred or paid "within a reasonable period
of time" and which is (C) "attributable to education." Id. § 221(d)(1).
56 There are multiple tests that have been developed by courts to test undue hardship. However,
the Brunner test and the totality-of-the-circumstances test are the most commonly used and
[Vol. 119
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1. Student Loans in Bankruptcy: A Look at the Case Law
Scholars have articulated that the American bankruptcy system hinges
on the notion of providing a "fresh start" to the debtor, and this is a goal that has
been recognized by both Congress and the Supreme Court.57 In the case of
student loans, this fresh start is limited by statute to those borrowers who would
experience undue hardship without it,58 but the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code
did not define that term.59 Instead, the question of what constitutes undue
hardship was left to the bankruptcy courts, to be decided on a case-by-case
basis.60 Over the years, many different tests have been adopted by courts, 6' but
today, two tests have remained popular: the Second Circuit's Brunner test, and
the Eighth Circuit's totality-of-the-circumstances test.
i. The Second Circuit: Brunner v. New York State Higher
Education Services Corporation
In Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp.,62 the
Second Circuit set forth an interpretation of the statutory term "undue hardship"
that served as a primary standard for courts determining bankruptcy discharge.
In Brunner, the bankruptcy court discharged the borrower's educational loans
based on a finding that repayment would cause undue hardship given the
borrower's circumstances.63 The creditor appealed to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, which found that it was clear error
for the bankruptcy court to discharge the borrower's student loans.64
therefore are the only ones discussed in this Note. For a detailed analysis of tests, see Huey, supra
note 37.
57 Jeffrey L. Zackerman, Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy: The Need for a Uniform
"Undue Hardship" Test, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 691, 691 (1997).
58 See § 523(a)(8).
59 Kurt Wiese, Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy: The Bankruptcy Court Tests of
'Undue Hardship', 26 ARIz. L. REv. 445, 447 (1984) (citing H.R. Doc. 93-137, at 140 (1973)).
60 Id. at 447.
61 See, e.g., id. at 448-51 (describing the bankruptcy commission test, the In re Johnson test,
the Wegfert analysis); Zackerman, supra note 57, at 701-13, 720-21 (discussing the Johnson test,
the Bryant test, and the Brunner test, and hypothesizing that Brunner would become the test of
choice for many courts).
62 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
63 Id. at 396; see also In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 756-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Marie Brunner
had received her bachelor's degree in 1979 and her master's degree in social work in 1982. Seven
months after receiving her master's degree, she filed for bankruptcy. Her student loans accounted
for 80% of her total indebtedness and, at the time that she filed for discharge, she had no
employment prospects. See id. for this factual background.
64 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
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The Second Circuit, reviewing the lower courts' findings for clear error,
held that it was not required to accept the bankruptcy court's conclusions of
law.65 The circuit found that the determination of whether failing to discharge
the student loans would impose "'undue hardship' under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8)(B) require[d] a conclusion regarding the legal effect of the bankruptcy
court's findings as to her circumstances" and was therefore appropriately
reviewed by the district court.66 The district court had determined that discharge
of student loans would only be appropriate if the debtor showed: (1) if she were
required to repay the loans, she could not "maintain... a 'minimal' standard of
living for herself and her dependents" given her current expenses and income;
(2) the presence of "additional circumstances" to indicate that her current
situation was "likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period;"
and finally (3) that the borrower had made "good faith efforts to repay the
loans. 67
The Second Circuit noted that other courts had frequently applied the
first part of the test in order to establish the undue hardship standard68 and that
the additional elements were "reasonable," given the "clear congressional intent"
of the statute by "mak[ing] the discharge of student loans more difficult than that
of other nonexcepted debt., 69 Utilizing the three-part test set forth by the district
court, the Second Circuit agreed that Ms. Brunner had failed to establish
sufficient undue hardship to discharge her student loans. 70 The court found that
"the record demonstrate[d] no 'additional circumstances,"' such as: (1) a
demonstrated likelihood that Ms. Brunner would not find work for a "significant
portion of the loan repayment period;" (2) that she was "not disabled, nor
elderly;" (3) that Ms. Brunner had disclosed no dependents on the record; (4) a
lack of "evidence ... present[ing] a total foreclosure of job prospects in her area
of training;" (5) the fact that only ten months had passed since Ms. Brunner had
graduated from her program and searched for employment; and (6) that Ms.
Brunner filed for discharge without first seeking a "less drastic remedy," such as
a deferment of payment, and had therefore not shown a "good faith attempt" at
repayment.71
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See id. (collecting cases).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 396-97.
[Vol. 119
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ii. The Eighth Circuit: Long v. Educational Credit Management
Corporation
The Eighth Circuit has consistently held that the three-part test from
Brunner is too restrictive, in part because under the Brunner analysis, a debtor
must meet every part of the test or the debt is not dischargeable.72 In Long v.
Educational Credit Management Corp., the Eighth Circuit expressly rejected the
Brunner test, choosing instead to reaffirm the pre-Brunner "totality-of-the-
circumstances" test adopted by the Eighth Circuit in 1981 .73 The totality-of-the-
circumstances test urges courts to consider (1) "reasonably reliable future
financial resources" as well as past and present resources, (2) the debtor's
"reasonable necessary living expenses," and (3) "any other relevant facts and
circumstances" surrounding each particular bankruptcy case.74
In the Eighth Circuit's view, the totality-of-the-circumstances test is
more flexible and honors the "inherent (judicial) discretion" implied in the statute
and intended by Congress.75 The court articulated in Long that the purpose of
limiting student loan debt dischargeability was to "prevent recent graduates who
were beginning lucrative careers" from "escap[ing] their student loan
obligation[s]."76 The court believed that the "legislative purpose and policy"
accompanying the exception "is decidedly absent in the meaning Congress
ascribed to the term 'undue hardship,"' because the Bankruptcy Code does not
define the term.77 As a result, a "divergent body of appellate authority" has
struggled to define the term,7 8 and, while a majority of Circuits has adopted the
72 Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003). Nanci Long was a
39-year-old single mother with a chiropractic degree, which she had financed through substantial
loans. In 1993, Long developed extreme depression, which affected her work and personal life,
resulting in the loss of her practice and culminating in attempted suicide. In 1997, after extensive
professional support, Long had recovered somewhat and was employed and back in school, but
was making significantly less than before; she was also still suffering from daily, disabling
depressive episodes. Long had paid on her student loans consistently for ten years before her
breakdown, and the Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court's refusal to grant Long's discharge,
finding that her circumstances met the undue burden standard. See id. at 549-53 for this factual
background.
73 See, e.g., id. at 553; see also Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp., 661 F.2d 702,
704 (8th Cir. 1981).
74 Long, 322 F.3d at 554.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. (collecting cases).
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Brunner test,79 the Eighth Circuit has continued to utilize the totality-of-the-
circumstances test, honoring its deference to judicial discretion. 80
2. Discharge of Student Loans Is Not Impossible, or Limited to
Bankruptcy
The standard for discharging student loans is a high bar, subject to a fact-
intensive inquiry. 8' However, Denise Bronsdon's story proves that discharge is
not an impossible standard to meet. 82 Further, because the determination of
"undue burden" is a question of law to be reviewed de novo,83 it is not unusual
for appellate courts, reviewing the exact same facts, to come to opposite
conclusions regarding a borrower's qualifications.8 4 Despite these facts, some
scholars believe that few debtors attempt discharge for three reasons: (1) private
educational lenders are likely to negotiate with distressed borrowers outside of
the court system; (2) there are administrative programs that assist federal
borrowers in distress; and (3) the media has convinced borrowers that they have
no chance of discharging their student loan debts in bankruptcy. 85
Additionally, bankruptcy discharge is not the only way that borrowers
can seek to rid themselves of debt.86 Student borrowers may also seek discharge
for disability or for certain institutional misconduct under the Higher Education
Act ("HEA").87 Under the HEA provision, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087,
borrowers who receive loans after January 1, 1986, can pursue discharge in three
circumstances because of institutional misconduct.8 8 Students may discharge
their loan obligations if the higher education institution closes, has advertised a
79 Id.
80 "We apply a totality-of-the-circumstances test in determining undue hardship under §
523(a)(8)." Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2009).
81 Huey, supra note 37, at 90-91.
82 See supra notes 2-16 and accompanying text.
83 See Long, 322 F.3d at 553 (collecting cases where the Third Circuit, Ninth Circuit, Sixth
Circuit, Tenth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, and Second Circuit concluded that the undue hardship
determination is a question of law requiring de novo review).
84 See, e.g., Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish, 72 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 1995)
(bankruptcy court discharged the debt, district court reversed, circuit court upheld the reversal);
Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (bankruptcy court
discharged loans, district court reversed, circuit court upheld the reversal).
85 Richard B. Keeton, Guaranteed to Work or It's Free!: The Evolution of Student Loan
Discharge in Bankruptcy and the Ninth Circuit's Ruling in Hedlund v. Educational Resources
Institute, Inc., 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 66-70 (2015).
86 Doug Rendleman & Scott Weingart, Collection of Student Loans: A Critical Examination,
20 WASH. & LEE J. Civ. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 215, 262 (2014).
87 Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1087(c) (2012)).
88 Id. at 262-63.
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false certification, or fails to pay the student a required refund.89 If a student
shows that the statutory requirements relating to one of these provisions have
been met, the loan is discharged, and, in exchange, the borrower transfers all
claims to any refund of the discharged loan to the Department of Education and
agrees to cooperate with attempts to enforce collection.9"
This method of discharge, like the undue burden prohibition, is not easy
to obtain.91 Students may only qualify under the school closure provision if the
program for which the loans were obtained closes and the student chooses not to
complete a different program. 92 Borrowers' discharge abilities are also
foreclosed if the school offers a "teach out" program at another school that the
student participates in or if the borrower chooses to continue his or her education
by transferring credits earned to another school.93
Finally, borrowers may seek discharge for death and disability.
94
Disability, however, is another high standard that triggers a high degree of
proof.95 To receive discharge based on disability, borrowers must submit
applications, including a certification by a physician of permanent and total
disability, to the lender or to the Department of Education.96 If approved for a
disability discharge, the borrower is required to update the Department of all
changes in address and annual earnings, and such earnings have the potential to
reinstate a previously-discharged loan.97
C. Recent Investigations of the Student Loan Servicing System
In 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB")
acknowledged that there was a discrepancy between the standards student loan
borrowers were held to and the standards applicable to student loan servicers by
announcing that it would begin to more closely regulate the student loan market
in response to increased reports of alleged abuses of borrowers by student loan
servicers.98 The CFPB addressed the issue by subjecting student loan servicing
89 Id. at 262.
90 Id. at 263.
91 Id. at 262.
92 Id. at 263 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1087(c) (2012); 34 C.F.R. §§ 674.33(g)(2), 682.402(d)(2),
685.214(b) (2016)).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 268 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087(a)(1), 1087dd(c)(1)(F)(i) (2012); 34 C.F.R. §§
685.212(a), 682.402(b), 674.61(a) (2016)).
95 Id. at 269.
96 Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. §§ 674.61(b)(2)(iv), 682.402(c)(2), 685.213(b)(1) (2016)).
97 Id. at 270.
98 Eleazar David Melendez, CFPB Will Regulate Student Loan Debt Servicers, HUFF1NGTON
POST Bus. (Mar. 14, 2013, 3:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/14/cfpb-student-
loan-debt n_2877345.html.
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companies to audits by the CFPB and by establishing fines for servicers who
violate federal statutes governing lending.99 This new area of regulation was a
response investigation that revealed that student loan borrowers "are often
victimized by costly and frustrating errors" perpetuated by the third-party
companies that service their student loans.1°°
The Huffington Post, in a separate investigation, found that some student
loan servicers "engage in practices meant to defraud borrowers, especially when
dealing with those at risk of defaulting." 10 1 The Director of the CFPB told
reporters that the CFPB had "heard complaints from private loan borrowers that
no one makes servicers accountable," and that the agency intended to change that
by making sure that servicers "play[ed] by the rules and treat[ed] borrowers
appropriately."'1 2 The CFPB explained that it was concerned with "cracking
down" on companies that served more than one million clients, extending
oversight to seven new companies and, by extension, 80% of the student loan
market.'0 3
1. The Current CFPB Student Loan Servicing Complaint Process
Under the CFPB regulations revised after the 2013 announcement, loan
servicers are obligated to investigate and correct errors alleged by borrowers,
provide information to borrowers, and protect borrowers with industry-specific
relief programs. 104 Servicers must also provide information about loss mitigation
to borrowers and establish programs that facilitate communications with
delinquent and distressed borrowers at risk of default.'0 5
When servicers fail to perform these tasks, the CFPB investigates after
borrowers submit a "complaint" to the CFPB, which is forwarded to the company
against the allegedly at-fault company. 10 6 The CFPB then "work[s] to get a
response" about the issue and, if necessary, forwards the complaint to any other
government agency under whose jurisdiction the issue may fall. 107 Then, the
servicing company is given the opportunity to "review[] [the] complaint,
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.; see also Chris Kirkham, For-Profit Colleges Manage Student Loan Default Rates,
Senators Call for Investigation, HUFFINGTON POST Bus. (Dec. 27, 2012, 5:33 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/27/for-profit-colleges-student-loan-
default n 2371688.html.
102 See generally Melendez, supra note 98.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 The Complaint Process, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/process (last visited Nov. 4, 2016).
107 Id.
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communicate[] with [the consumer] as needed, and report[] back [to the CFPB]
about the steps taken or that will be taken on the issue [that was the subject of
the complaint]."'10 8 When excessive complaints are lodged against a company,
the CFPB may take large-scale action; in 2015, the CFPB instituted a $2.5
million penalty against Discover Bank for servicing errors and required Discover
to refund $16 million to student loan borrowers.10 9
After the company's response, the complainant is notified and given the
opportunity to "review [the] response" and provide feedback to the CFPB on the
process; when the complaint is resolved, it is published on the CFPB's Consumer
Complaint Database, where the public can review all problems reported to the
CFPB. 11°
2. Renewed Focus on Servicers
Despite these changes, the CFPB admitted in 2015 that the regulatory
extensions had not reached the total impact desired and that student loan
servicing regulations are still not as complete and effective as students,
regulators, and advocates would like.i"' This admission was a result of President
Obama's direct comments on the student loan market in March 2015.112 In a
memorandum titled "A Student Aid Bill of Rights to Help Ensure Affordable
Loan Repayment," President Obama directly challenged the CFPB's regulations
and alleged that the current system remains inadequate to meet borrowers'
needs." 3 Specifically, the President called for "stronger protections" for student
loan borrowers and offered specific areas in which his Administration believes
that the student loan servicing market could be improved. 14 As a result of that
memorandum, the CFPB launched a public inquiry regarding student loan
servicing experiences and, uniquely, asked consumers to consider the
effectiveness of the elevated servicing regulations that have been implemented
in other consumer industries, such as the mortgage and credit card industries." 5
108 Id.
109 CFPB Orders Discover Bank to Pay $18.5 Million for Illegal Student Loan Servicing
Practices, CFPB NEWSROOM (July 22, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-discover-bank-to-pay- 18-5-million-for-illegal-student-loan-servicing-
practices/.
110 Id.
11 See e.g., CFPB Launches Public Inquiry, supra note 17; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING STUDENT LOAN SERVICING [hereinafter REQUEST FOR
INFORMATION], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201505-cfpb-rfi-student-loan-servicing.pdf.
112 See Presidential Memorandum, supra note 36.
113 See id.
114 Id.
115 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 3.
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The CFPB requested that the public and servicing industry provide
information "[r]egarding [s]tudent [1]oan [s]ervicing."' 16 The request was broad
and directed at individuals and organizations across the spectrum of the
borrowing, collecting, and servicing of private and government-funded student
loans to "assist market participants and policymakers on potential options to
improve borrower service, reduce defaults, develop best practices, assess
consumer protections, and spur innovation."' 7 The request for comments was
extended to borrowers, student organizations, technology providers, education
institutions, financing services providers, credit reporting agencies, debt
collectors, and civil rights groups, among others.1 18 As part of the request, the
CFPB also released a detailed report on the current status of student loan
servicing to provide context for comments. 1 9 The CFPB explained that the
student loan market is unique in that market data is limited and often incomplete
compared to other consumer industries.12°
i. Types of Student Loans
The CFPB has identified "three main types of post-secondary education
loans under which borrowers have outstanding balances" that would be affected
by regulatory changes. 121 These include (1) loans made under the Federal Family
Education Program ("Family Education"); (2) loans made through the William
D. Ford Federal Direct Loan program ("Direct Loans"), and (3) private loans. 122
The first type, Family Education loans, are no longer an option for borrowers,1 23
but were a program to fund education wherein private capital was guaranteed by
a government entity or non-profit and then reinsured by the government.1 24
Under the Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act ("SAFRA"), 125 the
origination of new loans guaranteed under the Family Education program has
been indefinitely halted. 126 Still, the Department of Education estimates that
116 Id. at 1.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 3.
119 See generally id. at 1-36.
120 Id. at 4; see CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU & U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PRIVATE STUDENT
LOANS REPORT (2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/reports/private-student-loans-report/.
121 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 5.
122 Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 1078(bHc) (2012).
123 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 5.
124 Id. at 5-6.
125 SAFRA was included in the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010; Pub.
L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
126 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 6.
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more than $380 billion remain outstanding under this program. 127 The CFPB
asserts that a "noteworthy portion of these loans" also currently serve as
"collateral for asset-backed securities."1 28 The servicing model that these loans
operate under is simple: they are either served by the holders themselves or by
any third party with which the holder has contracted. 1
29
In 2010, the Department of Education shifted from the Family Education
program to a system of direct lending. 130 Although the Direct Loan program has
existed since 1992,131 Direct Loans were only a small portion of the student loan
picture until SAFRA. 132 Direct Loans are serviced by third-party companies
under contract with the Department of Education under Title IV of the HEA. 133
At the end of the 2014 calendar year, approximately 28.5 million borrowers owed
more than $744 billion dollars in Direct Loans.1 34
The final large category of student loans is private student loans, which
are loans not originated or secured by the government.135 Instead, these loans are
originated by large depositories or special loan companies, and a large portion of
these loans also serve as collateral for asset-backed securities. 136 This sector of
the student loan market on which the least data is available, as participants
generally are not required to provide origination and performance information to
the public or for regulatory purposes.1
37
ii. Servicing of Student Loans
Most student loans are serviced by a third-party servicer who acts as the
primary point of contact regarding repayment and account management. 138 The
CFPB has defined student loan servicing to include three primary duties: (1)
student loan servicers typically receive loan payments and apply those payments
127 Id. at 5; U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., FEDERAL STUDENT AID PORTFOLIO SUMMARY,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/about/data-center/student/portfolio.
128 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 6; see also SALLIE MAE, SLM CORPORATION:
OVERVIEW OF FFELP AND FFELP ABS TRANSACTIONS (2012),
https://www.navient.com/assets/about/investors/webcasts/2012FFELPOverviewvFinal.pdf.
129 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 6.
130 Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 111-152, §§ 2101-213, 124 Stat. 1071-81).
131 Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 569 (1992).
132 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 6 n. 10.
133 Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1087f(b) (2012).
134 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 6; see FEDERAL STUDENT AID PORTFOLIO
SUMMARY, supra note 127.
135 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note I 11, at 6.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 7.
138 Id.
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to borrowers' accounts; (2) servicers maintain records and communicate with
borrowers during periods when payments may not be required; and (3) servicers
communicate with borrowers to "help prevent default" and to "facilitate the
[foregoing] activities."'1 39 Both a major focus of the CFPB and the President's
Memorandum is the fate of the 8 million students in default on their student loan
obligations-and the fate of the $110 billion in outstanding and unpaid
balances. 140 In addition, 3 million more direct loan borrowers are more than 30
days past due, tying up another $58 billion. 41
3. Report and Recommendations
After the Call for Comments and related investigations, the CFPB
released a report ("2015 Report") stating that problems in servicing were directly
related to the fact that "there is no existing, comprehensive federal statutory or
regulatory framework providing consistent standards for the servicing of all
student loans. 142 In the 2015 Report, the CFPB confirmed that "the respective
loan types come with varying levels of consumer protections and special
benefits" 143 but, generally, that all student loans need stronger servicing
protections. The CFPB concluded that there are four areas where servicing
guidelines could be substantially improved and that these goals should be the
focus of the CFPB, Department of Education, and other agencies to strengthen
protections for all student loan borrowers. 1
44
In the 2015 Report, the CFPB included four areas of student loan
servicing that needed specific improvements. First, the CFPB concluded that
guidelines that describe appropriate servicing must be more consistent and must
articulate a "clear set of expectations for what constitutes minimum requirements
for services."' 145 Second, information must be "accurate and actionable," or
"presented in a manner that best informs borrowers, helps them achieve possible
outcomes, and mitigates the risk and cost of default.' ' 146 Third, the entire student
loan servicing system must become more transparent, so that "[t]he public,
including student loan borrowers, may benefit from information about the
performance of private and federal loans and the practices of individual student
139 12 C.F.R. § 1090.106 (2016).
140 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note I 11, at 9; see FEDERAL STUDENT AID PORTFOLIO
SUMMARY, supra note 127 (reporting that, at the end of the first quarter in 2015, 7.3 million federal
loan borrowers were in default, and their outstanding balance totaled more than $106 billion).
141 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 9; see also FEDERAL STUDENT AID
PORTFOLIO SUMMARY, supra note 127.
142 2015 REPORT, supra note 21, at 11.
143 Id. at 150.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
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loan lenders and servicers.' '147 Finally, the report recommends that "borrowers,
federal and state agencies and regulators, and law enforcement officials should
have access to appropriate channels for recourse."
148
D. An Example of Successful Reform: The Mortgage Sector
As consumer advocates have expressed growing concern regarding the
standards that apply to the loan holders and servicers who manage student debt
in the United States, 149 the CFPB has indicated that the mortgage sector is a place
to look to for a solution to the problem in student loan servicing. 150 In 2013, the
CFPB Director acknowledged that "[p]roblems in mortgage servicing ha[d]
plagued consumers for years" and that these problems contributed to the 2008
mortgage crisis. 151 Yet, in its Call for Comments, 152 the CFPB asked student loan
borrowers to examine the regulatory response to the mortgage crisis and to
provide comments about experiences in that market. 153
1. Mortgage Servicers
The CFPB characterizes mortgage servicers, like student loan servicers,
as companies that collect payments, handle customer service, collections, loan
modifications, and foreclosures. 154 The CFPB admitted that "[e]ven before the
[2008] financial crisis," when problems of mortgage servicing became national
news, "the mortgage servicing industry.., experienced problems with bad
practices and sloppy recordkeeping.' '155 Further, "[a]s millions of borrowers fell
behind on their loans[,] ... servicers were unable to provide the level of service
necessary to meet homeowners' needs. 156 Increasing regulation was the CFPB's
147 Id. at 151.
148 Id.
149 See, e.g., New York Looking at Student Debt Relief Companies for Signs of Abuse, 19 No.
20 WESTLAW J. BANK & LENDER LIABILITY 4 (Feb. 24, 2014).
150 See Presidential Memorandum, supra note 36.
151 CFPB Supervision Report Highlights Mortgage Servicing Problems in 2013, CFPB
NEWSROOM (Jan. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Supervision Report],
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-supervision-report-highlights-mortgage-
servicing-problems-in-2013/. For a detailed examination of the mortgage crisis, causes, and effects,
see KEITH HENNESSEY, DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN & BILL THOMAS, CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS, http ://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdnmedia/fcic-
reports/fcic final-reporthennessey-holtz-eakinthomasdissent.pdf.
152 See REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note 111.
153 Id.
154 Supervision Report, supra note 15 1.
155 Id.
156 Id.
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response to these problems, and the recent inquiry exhibits a trend toward
modeling the student loan market after the regulatory reforms implemented in
the mortgage sector.
1 57
2. Expanded Servicing Regulation in Response to the Mortgage Crisis
In 2013, the CFPB expanded and tightened regulations around mortgage
servicers through the implementation of the 2013 Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act ("RESPA") and amendments to the Truth in Lending Act
("TILA").158 Under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, disclosures, force-placed
insurance, and periodic statements for mortgage loans became required for
adjustable-rate mortgages. 159 The Dodd-Frank Act also required "prompt
crediting or mortgage payments and providing payoff statements to consumers"
in addition to "requir[ing] servicers to take action to correct certain errors
asserted by [borrowers] regarding their mortgages and to respond to requests for
certain information from [borrowers] regarding their mortgages.' 160 The Dodd-
Frank Act was supplemented by TILA and RESPA, which expanded servicing
rules to enforce these requirements.161 Finally, the "Mortgage Servicing Rules"
issued by the CFPB to supplement these statutes focus on "policies, procedures,
and requirements" that require servicers to contact borrowers and "work with
them to be considered for applicable loss mitigation options."
'162
These servicing rules do not apply to "small [mortgage loan] servicers,"
companies that service 5,000 or fewer loans. 163 For all other servicing companies,
however, the servicing rules specified the activities of mortgage servicers and
the way that servicers were required to deal with borrowers in default or at risk
of default. RESPA established general servicing policies, procedures, and
requirements for all mortgage servicers that are not exempt under the small
157 See, for example, the CFPB's major revisions of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
of 1974 through the 2013 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth in
Lending Act (Regulation Z). A brief summary of these statutory provisions can be found at
Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation A),
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. Bureau http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulations/2013-real-estate-
settlement-procedures-act-regulation-x-and-truth-in-lending-act-regulation-z-mortgage-servicing-
final-rules/ (last updated Feb. 14, 2013).
158 See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 2013 REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
ACT (REGULATION X) AND TRUTH IN LENDING ACT (REGULATION Z) MORTGAGE SERVICING FINAL
RULES: SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE (2013) [hereinafter SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE
GUIDE], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306-cfpb-compliance-guide2013-mortgage-
servicing-rules.pdf.
159 Id. at 11.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 11-12
162 Id.
163 Id. at 17; see also 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41(e)(4) (2015).
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164
servicers exception. RESPA set forth "[r]easonable policies" that "shall [be]
maintain[ed]" and "that are reasonably designed to achieve the objectives set
forth in [the regulations.]" 165 The objectives include "providing timely and
accurate information," including providing "accurate and timely disclosures to
[the] borrower;" "[i]nvestigat[ing], respond[ing] to, and, as appropriate,
mak[ing] corrections in response to complaints asserted by a borrower;" and
"[p]roperly evaluating loss mitigation applications. '166
The entire scheme that underlies the general procedures for servicers
under RESPA is based on "[f]acilitat[ing] the sharing of accurate and current
information" 167 regarding all aspects of the servicing relationship. This includes
the status and evaluation of loss mitigation and foreclosure proceedings,
including information about "personnel assigned to a borrower's mortgage loan
account, ' 168 information about servicing transfers, 69 information about "error
resolution and information requests procedures,"170 and compliance by service
providers of all applicable regulations. The scheme also includes "periodic
reviews of service providers, including by providing appropriate servicer
personnel with documents and information necessary to audit compliance by
service providers[.]"' 1
71
TILA's overall purpose and provisions are similar to RESPA's in that
the act focuses on proper and prompt notification of interest rate adjustments for
adjustable-rate mortgages, proper crediting of payments, prompt responses to
requests for payoff information, and periodic statements about the status of
mortgage loans. 172 TILA has been in place since 1968, but subsequent to the
mortgage crisis, was amended to protect mortgage consumers "from unfair,
abusive, or deceptive lending and servicing practices.' 73 Specifically, this 2008
amendment increased regulations on "a newly defined category of 'higher-priced
mortgage loans' that includes virtually all closed-end subprime loans secured by
a consumer's principal dwelling."' 7 4 TILA was also broadened by the Mortgage
Disclosure Improvement Act of 2009, which requires early disclosures for more
164 See SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 158.
165 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38(a) (emphasis added).
166 Id. § 1024.38(b).
167 Id. § 1024.38(b)(3)(iii).
168 Id.
169 Id. § 1024.38(b)(4)(i)-(iii).
170 Id. § 1024.38(b)(5).
171 Id. § 1024.38(b)(3)(i)-(iii).
172 SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 158, at 12; see 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.20,
1026.36(c), 1026.41.
173 FDIC, FDIC COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL V-1.1 (2015),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/ComplianceExaminationManual.pdf.
174 Id.
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types of transactions and adds a waiting period between the time that disclosures
are given and the time the transaction is completed.1 75 TILA now requires
disclosures of payments, interest rates, and other financial statements. 176
3. Regulatory Changes Were Supplemented by Fee-Shifting Statutes
Federal statutes and increased regulations were supplemented in the
mortgage context by state-level fee-shifting provisions that provided a way for
borrowers without the means to hire an attorney to challenge companies that
allegedly improperly serviced their mortgage loans under consumer protection
statutes, known as Unfair and Deceptive Practices ("UDAP") laws.1 77 Legal
scholars have described fee-shifting statutes as "[t]he most significant exception
to the 'American Rule' that civil litigants bear their own attorney fees[.] 178
These statutes function by "permit[ting] fee awards to successful plaintiffs in
order to encourage litigation deemed to be in the public interest. ' 179 Fee-shifting
statutes, created to increase civil rights litigation, 180 have expanded to other areas
of the law that have inadequate economic incentives for attorneys to litigate.1 81
The American Bar Association describes two types of fee-shifting schemes: the
first "requiring the loser in a legal matter to pay the legal fees and costs of the
prevailing party"; the second "unilaterally shift[ing fees] so that losing
defendants must pay the plaintiffs reasonable attorney fees and costs."'182
Despite CFPB regulations and complaint process, many consumers
found that the best way to experience immediate relief in consumer issues after
the mortgage crisis was to take on their servicers and lenders directly, in
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 For example, see Mountain State Justice ("MSJ"), a legal services and civil litigation law
firm that "provides aggressive legal advocacy on behalf of low-income West Virginians,"
particularly those who have been the victims of predatory lending and illegal loan servicing. MSJ
often brings suits against banks, lenders, and servicers and then seeks reimbursement for fees under
the West Virginia Consumer Protection Act and section 104, article 5, chapter 46A of the West
Virginia Code. For more information and stories about MSJ clients, see MOUNTAIN ST. JUST.
http://www.mountainstatejustice.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2016); see also CAROLYN L. CARTER,
NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., INC., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 3 (Feb. 2009),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car-sales/UDAP-ReportFeb09.pdf.
178 Percival & Miller, supra note 26, at 233.
179 Id.
180 See id. at 233-34.
181 Id. at 237-38.
182 Id.
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adversarial proceedings.'83 Using state fee-shifting statutory provisions,
individuals challenged servicers in courts rather than through the CFPB
complaint process, providing immediate results for the poorest victims of the
mortgage crisis. 184 Successful individual challenges, brought under state
consumer protection codes, offered immediate relief to individual borrowers who
could prove that their servicing was inadequate while simultaneously policing
servicing standards and ensuring conformity to national goals set forth by the
CFPB.
III. ANALYSIS
This Note argues that the current bankruptcy standards for student loan
discharge create a vulnerable population of student borrowers that are susceptible
to unconscionable loan servicing practices. Although regulators have
investigated ways to increase borrower protections through increased oversight,
such provisions are inadequate. Using the success of the mortgage servicing
reforms as a guide, student loan borrowers must have a method of individually
challenging student loan servicers in the courts to achieve immediate and
individual relief. Overall, this Note proposes that strong fee-shifting
provisions-applicable to student loan borrowers-should be added to consumer
protection statutes to fully and adequately protect student loan borrowers.
Part II of this Note outlined the history of student loans in the United
States, the undue burden standard on bankruptcy discharge, and key elements of
mortgage crisis reform, which provided independent relief for individual
consumers in the courts. Here, in Part III, this Note addresses the shortcomings
of the current student loan servicing complaint system and argues that increasing
regulation must be accompanied by increased state-level statutory protections.
For these statutory protections to be efficient, these consumer protection laws
must include vehicles for bringing independent claims for unconscionable and
illegal loan servicing, including fee-shifting statutes, which provide for and
encourage adversarial challenge. Section A will explore the 2015 Report's most
pertinent recommendation, increasing legal accountability for servicers. Section
B discusses the failures in the current CFPB complaint process. Section C puts
forth the argument that increasing accountability must be a primary goal of any
servicing reform, and introduces the idea that fee-shifting provisions in consumer
protection statutes can be an effective way of achieving this goal. This section
offers the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act's fee-shifting
provisions as an adequate basis for new legal reforms. Section D argues that fee-
183 See, e.g., Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown, 737 S.E.2d 640 (W. Va. 2012) (plaintiff borrower
in interest brought a successful claim against lender for fraud and unconscionable contracts under
the West Virginia Consumer and Credit Protection Act).
184 See, for example, Mountain State Justice's shared success stories at MOUNTAIN ST. JUST.,
supra note 177.
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shifting provision can supplement regulatory reforms and unite the interests of
the government, students, and loan servicers. Lastly, this Note concludes by
examining the disadvantageous possibilities that could threaten the consumer
market if proper legal action is not taken.
A. The CFPB's 2015 Report Rightfully Recommends Increasing Legal
Accountability for Servicers
As illustrated in Part II of this Note, a significant critique of the current
student loan servicing market is that "there is no existing, comprehensive federal
statutory or regulatory framework providing consistent standards for the
servicing of all student loans."'1 85 Instead, federal student loans are regulated
separately from private loans, under regulations provided by the Department of
Education, as authorized by the HEA.186 Under these regulations, student loan
borrowers who used federal loans have access to mitigation plans such as
Income-Based Repayment and Pay As You Earn options, which are not provided
to private loan borrowers.1 87 Despite these plans, recent research indicates that
major issues remain within federal student loans because, even though required
to do so, "[b]orrowers may not be informed" from servicers about "basic
information about [these] alternative repayment plans."' 188 Most importantly,
however, research confirms that federal student loan borrowers are not immune
to the servicing failures that also plague private student loan borrowers, are often
not enrolled in correct repayment plans because of processing errors, 18 and can
encounter costly delays when attempting to provide necessary information to
update their plans. 190
In the 2015 Report released after the CFPB's Call for Comments and
investigation, 91 the CFPB confirmed that "the respective loan types come with
varying levels of consumer protections and special benefits," but that all student
loans need stronger servicing protections.' 92 The report's conclusion was that
there are four areas where servicing guidelines could be substantially improved,
and these "goals" should be the focus of the CFPB, Department of Education,
and other agencies to strengthen protections for all student loan borrowers.' 93
185 2015 REPORT, supra note 21, at 103.
186 Id. at 21.
187 Id. at 22.
188 Id. at 25.
189 Id. at 28.
190 Id. at 30-31.
191 See supra Part II.C.2.
192 2015 REPORT, supra note 21, at 150.
193 Id. at 150-51.
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First, the CFPB recommends that new guidelines are needed, guidelines
that describe appropriate servicing consistently and that articulate a "clear set of
expectations for what constitutes minimum requirements for services."'
94
Second, information provided to borrowers must be "accurate and actionable"-
the information must be correct and "presented in a manner that best informs
borrowers, helps them achieve possible outcomes, and mitigates the risk and cost
of default."'1 95 Third, the entire system of student loan servicing must become
more transparent, so that "[t]he public, including student loan borrowers, may
benefit from information about the performance of private and federal loans and
the practices of individual student loan lenders and servicer[s.]"
196
Most importantly, the report suggests that servicing guidelines must
provide more accountability. 197 The report acknowledges that, in order for other
changes to be effective and to adequately address the identified problems in
student loan servicing, "borrowers, federal and state agencies and regulators, and
law enforcement officials should have access to appropriate channels for
recourse[.]"' 98 Presumably, this would begin with identifying and structuring a
regulatory scheme that would set forth specifically the requirements of servicers
and that would provide guidelines for agencies, law enforcement, and borrowers
to identify sub-standard activities and seek correction. Given the findings of the
CFPB's investigations, this is an apt recommendation.
In light of the regulatory successes that accompanied servicing reform
in the mortgage sector, which the CFPB has indicated would be an ideal model
to utilize for student loan servicing reform, increasing accountability through
more specific statutory and regulatory control may not be sufficient. Such
statutes would be meaningless if companies were not strictly required to
conform, and the current CFPB regulatory enforcement and complaint process is
not sufficient to address each individual challenges and provide individual relief
to borrowers in the most serious situations.
B. Current CFPB Regulatory Enforcement and Complaint Process Is
Inadequate to Provide Individual Relieffor All Complainants
The CFPB markets itself as "a 21st century agency that helps consumer
finance markets work by making rules more effective, by consistently and fairly
enforcing those rules, and by empowering consumers." 199 Under CFPB
regulations, loan servicers are obligated to investigate and correct errors alleged
194 Id. at 150.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 151.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 About Us, CONSUMER FtN. PROT. BUREAU, www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last
visited Nov. 4, 2016).
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by borrowers,200 to provide information to borrowers,2" 1 and to protect borrowers
with industry-specific relief programs.0 2 Servicers must provide information
about loss mitigation to borrowers and establish programs that facilitate
communications with delinquent and distressed borrowers at risk of default.20 3
When servicers fail to perform these tasks, the CFPB's approach to
resolving problems 24 is lengthy and bureaucratic; it begins when borrowers
submit a complaint to the CFPB, which is logged and then forwarded to the
offending company. The CFPB allows the company to respond to the allegation
with any defenses or explanations and, if it receives a response that is in some
way concerning, the CFPB forwards the response to any other agency that may
be implicated.20 5 The servicing company is given time to review the complaint,
investigate its cause, and communicate with the borrower to resolve the issue.20 6
In an ideal world, the servicer will correct its mistake or sufficiently
communicate with the borrower to determine and resolve the issue, and then will
inform the CFPB of the steps that have been taken and the resolution that has
been reached.207 After this idealistic resolution, the complaint is published on the
CFPB's Consumer Complaint Database, where the public can review all
problems reported to the CFPB related to that company. After the company's
response, the complainant is notified and given the opportunity to "review the
response" and provide feedback to the CFPB.2°8
The problem with this system of complaint resolution is that it assumes
compliance and adequate responses from all parties involved-and, given the
recent investigations and identification of widespread servicing errors, this is not
a realistic solution for all borrowers. Research shows that servicing companies
are committing errors on a wide scale, and, currently, CFPB regulators have not
been able to sufficiently curtail these abuses. The system is one that is better
suited to larger, collective actions, but these require a significant number of
complaints before large-scale action is taken. This interpretation is evidenced by
a 2015 CFPB decision that instituted a $2.5 million penalty against Discover
Bank for servicing errors and required Discover to refund $16 million to student
200 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35 (2016).
201 Id. § 1024.36.
202 See generally HELP FOR STRUGGLING BORROWERS, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (2013)
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb-mortgages help-for-struggling-borrowers.pdf.
203 About Us, supra note 199; see generally 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41 (2016).
204 See supra Part I.C. 1 for discussion of the CFPB complaint system.
205 About Us, supra note 199. See generally Submit a Complaint, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, www.consumerfinancial.gov/complaint (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
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loan borrowers.20 9 While that result is a significant step in that it shows that the
CFPB is holding student loan servicers to a high bar of service, such a decision
has less impact on each individual borrower, who may have suffered under poor
servicing for a lengthy period of time. While the CFPB has shown a willingness
to punish servicers whose errors negatively impact large communities of
borrowers, the individual effects for a borrower in distress would not be
immediate. Instead, only after an incredible number of errors illustrated a
widespread problem with servicing by Discover Bank did the CFPB issue a large
punitive verdict.
While the CFPB believes that its current system of "[c]omplaints
help... to supervise companies, enforce federal consumer financial laws, and
write better rules and regulations," as well as provide information to Congress
about issues that consumers experience, the system offers no adequate methods
under the current structure of enforcing individual relief for borrowers that
experience unconscionable servicing.210 Instead, the system assumes adequate
responses to individual issues or, in the alternative, passes along the issue to any
other applicable agency. The system, therefore, is best attuned to provide relief
on a large scale, which, while an important step, does not provide borrowers with
specific, immediate, individual relief.
C. Accountability and Individual Challenges Through State Fee-Shifting
Structures Is an Important Next Step in Student Loan Servicing Reform
Student loan servicers have always been required to comply with state
and federal laws, including federal consumer financial laws.211 Despite this,
problems have grown in student loan servicing even though many other
consumer markets have rebounded following the economic recession.212 The
CFPB's Call for Comments2 13 and subsequent report confirms the growing fear
that "current servicing practices may not meet the needs of borrowers or loan
holders . . . [or] taxpayers. 214 In order for success in student loan servicing
reform to be effective, regulators must realize that in the CFPB's model market,
mortgage loan servicing, change was not effectuated entirely by regulatory
changes. It was a combination of factors that led to the success of that model,
and the contributing effects of individual challenges under state laws should not
be overlooked.
209 The Complaint Process, supra note 106.
210 Id.
211 2015 REPORT, supra note 21, at 11-12.
212 Id. at 8.
213 See generally REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note 111.
214 2015 REPORT, supra note 21, at 12.
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While increased regulation in response to mortgage crisis focused on
"certain mortgage servicing practices [that created] a significant source of
distress" for homeowners,215 CFPB and agency action were not the only ways
that homeowners asserted their rights, challenged practices, and regained control
of their homes. In many instances, homeowners, empowered by qualified
advocates, challenged the servicers, holders, and originators of their loans
independently in court, and those challenges were an extra-regulatory part of the
effectiveness of the mortgage regulation revisions as well as a way that
borrowers were able to receive relief. The CFPB's suggestion of increasing
accountability2 16 is one that should be a primary focus of impending reforms, and
one that, given the past success of the mortgage loan servicing market, must be
supplemented with strong state consumer protection statutes, accompanied by
strong fee-shifting provisions, which are broadly interpreted and enforced.
1. Fee-Shifting Provisions Support Meaningful Challenges
Each state has its own form of Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices
("UDAP") statutes, commonly known as consumer provisions, which are the
"main lines of defense protecting consumers from predatory, deceptive, and
unscrupulous business practices.' 217 These state statutes complement and
overlap federal laws. 18 Consumer advocates believe that these protections are
the "bedrock protections for consumers. 219 Unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive
practices-practices that are illegal under regulatory structures-can extend to
"billions of transactions" affecting consumers and should "provide the main
protection... against predators and unscrupulous businesses. '220 Given the
government's prohibition against discharge of student loan debt, it is of extra-
importance for student loan holders and servicers to be held to the highest
standards; any deception, costly error, or unscrupulous practice is an extreme
disadvantage to student loan borrowers. Student loan borrowers, who are unable
to obtain the "fresh start" that is provided in bankruptcy discharge, are a
215 Id.
216 Id. at 151.
217 CARTER, supra note 177, at 3.
218 See, for example, Truth in Lending Act section 1640, which provides that creditors who
violate any requirement imposed by the Truth in Lending Act are liable to the consumer for the
total of all damages, including actual damages, statutory damages for violations of certain
provisions, court costs and attorney's fees, and the sum of all fees and finance charges paid for the
high-cost loan. See Robin P. Myers, Consumer Damages and Remedies for Truth in Lending Act
and Regulation Z Violations, FED. REs. BANK PHILA., https://www.philadelphiafed.org/bank-
resources/publications/compliance-corner/2006/fourth-quarter/q4ccl06 (last visited Nov. 6,
2016).
219 CARTER, supra note 177, at 5.
220 Id.
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vulnerable population who are "stuck" with their student loan debt, regardless of
the effectiveness of servicing activity, and therefore require the strictest
standards and highest levels of protection throughout the entire life of their loans.
Although the CFPB considers itself a "cop on the beat," the agency's
first enumerated goal is to "make sure consumers have the information they need
to choose the consumer financial products and services that are best for them." '221
The success stories listed on the CFPB website illustrate how complaints have
raised awareness of issues to increase regulation, and do not describe how the
CFPB has achieved "justice" or has otherwise "fixed" the problems that the
profiled consumers have experienced, nor how those consumers may have been
otherwise compensated.222 Added protections in the form of strong state
consumer laws, applicable to student loan borrowers and accompanied by
broadly interpreted fee-shifting provisions are needed in order to effectuate
individual relief and lasting change.
2. Not All Consumer Statutes Are the Same
While a majority of states has consumer protection statutes, the National
Consumer Law center has commented that "in almost all states significant gaps
or weaknesses undermine the promise of UDAP protections for consumers.,
223
The effectiveness of UDAP and other consumer law statutes has a wide variance
from state to state,224 a problem that would be increasingly frustrating in student
loan situations, where federal diversity jurisdiction 225 and a gateway to federal
court may not be available when debts are less than $75,000.
Most problematically, perhaps, the National Consumer Law Center has
identified a substantial problem in states where "the financial deck [is stacked]
against consumers who go to court to enforce the law themselves[]" due to the
absence or limited application of fee-shifting statutes.226 In every state except
Iowa, which does not allow consumers to proceed in court to enforce UDAP
provisions, consumers have the ability to pursue adversary proceedings to
enforce statutes and regulations that determine appropriate business practices.227
In Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, South Dakota, and Wyoming, consumers are
not able to recover their attorneys' fees at all. 28 Unbelievably, Alaska's UDAP
221 The Bureau, CONSUMER FN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/the-bureau/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2016).
222 Id.
223 CARTER, supra note 177, at 3.
224 Id.
225 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
226 CARTER, supra note 177, at 3.
227 Id.
228 Id.
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statute institutes a requirement that unsuccessful consumers pay partial
attorneys' fees to businesses, and in several other states, UDAP statutes have not
been "authoritatively interpreted to rule out this result. 2 29 Indeed, "special
procedural obstacles on consumers" under these statutory provisions "can hinder
or even prevent them from enforcing [the consumer statute]."23
i. Effective Statutes Must Include Broad Definitions
In order to provide adequate protection to student loan borrowers and
other consumers, UDAP statutes must include broad definitions of unfairness,
deception, and unconscionable practices, and the National Consumer Law Center
has specified that effective statutes must specifically include provisions that
extend not only to deceptive acts, but also to unfair acts.231 These statutes must
also have a broad scope of application and must not be worded in such a way
"that the statute appears to prohibit unfairness and deception but actually applies
to few businesses[.],, 232 In order to provide effective and long-lasting reforms in
the student loan market, accountability must be a priority. These UDAP statutes
must be broad enough to cover student loan servicers and must include references
to the regulatory provisions that define appropriate servicing activity. While
these statutes are a matter of individual state legislation, government and
agencies must encourage the passage of such provisions in order to provide
widespread and meaningful protection to student loan borrowers and to provide
reasonable structure and enforcement for student loan servicers.
ii. Attorneys' Fees Must be Broadly Awarded
A major critique of fee-shifting statutes is that there is a great deal of
judicial discretion in the decision of whether or not to award fees. 3 Scholars
have remarked that this system of discretion undermines the principles behind
fee shifting and that such "discretionary denial[s] ... [are] unwarranted once the
decision has been made to grant ... relief.,234 If the rationale behind fee-shifting
is to deter behavior, the system, on its face, supports mandatory awards, "or at
least gives reason to make the standard for the exercise of discretion lean strongly
in the direction of not denying a shift. 235 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory ofAttorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982
DUKE L.J. 651, 669.
234 Id. at 670.
235 Id.
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that shifting is always appropriate in favor of plaintiffs who prevail in civil rights
cases where statutes provide for that relief "unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust.236 Therefore, in addition to the need for individual
state consumer protections, which extend to student loan borrowers and student
loan servicers, the judiciary must be encouraged to award attorneys' fees in such
a way that makes these provisions meaningful and makes them a sufficient
deterrent for unconscionable and illegal servicing activity.
3. West Virginia's Consumer Credit Protection Act: An Example
Because of the varying UDAP and consumer statutes and the different
degrees of protection offered to consumers based on their geographic location, a
strong universal provision that is part of student loan reforms is necessary to
protect consumers and to enact lasting change in the student loan market. West
Virginia's provision under the Consumer Credit and Protection Act2 37 contains
language that would be a beneficial starting point, and the success of this
provision in the mortgage servicing industry has already been vetted.238 The
statute provides that if a claim is brought under applicable law, the court may
award "all or a portion of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney
fees, court costs and fees, to the consumer. ' '239 The statue also provides that,
should the court find that "a claim brought under this chapter. . . was brought in
bad faith and for the purposes of harassment[," then the court "may award to the
defendant reasonable attorney fees." '24
The bare bones of this statue are strong enough to serve the interests of
the government, servicers, and borrowers. Borrowers, who are held to a very high
bar when seeking to discharge their student loan debt in bankruptcy, have an
interest in making sure that their loans are serviced properly. It also provides
protections for servicing companies, which have the opportunity to collect their
own attorneys' fees from borrowers who would seek to utilize the adversarial
system for the purpose of harassment or otherwise to bring claims without merit.
However, such a provision should only be used in the most egregious
circumstances--certainly the mere fact that a borrower would not prevail on his
or her action should not be enough to require attorneys' fees-as such, a
provision would undermine the purpose of fee-shifting structures to encourage
lawful behavior by providing a way for wronged borrowers to challenge
meaningful claims in court.
236 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1978) (quoting Newman v.
Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
237 See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-1-101 et seq. (West 2016).
238 See, e.g., Mortgage Abuses, MOUNTAIN ST. JUST., http://www.mountainstatejustice.org/our-
work/mortgage-abuses/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
239 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5-104 (West 2016).
240 Id.
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Given the recent reports of servicing errors and their effect on borrowers,
particularly those in distress, 241 accountability in the form of adversarial
regulations that proscribe servicing behavior and that apply across the board to
all student loans should be a part of any reform system. Further, in order to
provide a way that these borrowers can challenge under these accountability
provisions, fee-shifting provisions should be included in borrowing contracts and
regulatory schemes, so that all borrowers can have the opportunity to bring
meaningful challenges, which provide for individual relief.
D. Fee-Shifting Structures to Supplement Regulatory Reforms Serve the
Interests of the Government, Students, and Servicers
Challenges brought in state courts against companies that service student
loans also serve the government's interest to see the repayment of student loans
and to make sure that borrowers are not victimized by costly errors. Fee-shifting
provisions serve the government's interest by supporting the high bar of
discharge for student loans while making sure that borrowers remain adequately
protected from poor servicing practices.
Servicing companies are also served through the implementation of this
provision. While the provision is discretionary, it should be noted that the award
of attorneys' fees is the way that challenges will be funded and, therefore, as the
Supreme Court has said, fees should generally be offered to prevailing parties.242
However, the West Virginia example statute includes an exception and
opportunity for reversal for those borrowers who attempt to abuse the system and
bring bad-faith claims.2 43 The deterrent effect would apply across the entire
servicing market as well, and so servicers who do comply with the law would
have the added benefit of seeing an increase in the overall effectiveness and
public opinion of their profession.
E. Consequences of Failing to Act
Failing to supplement borrower protections with adequate consumer
protection statutes and broadly-applied fee-shifting provisions is not one that will
make or break proposed regulatory reform. Indeed, improvement in this area of
state law would not have any reciprocal impact on the federal regulations. It
would, however, have a marked impact on individual borrowers, who would be
241 See generally 2015 REPORT, supra note 21.
242 See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1978) (quoting Newman
v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)); see also supra note 236 and accompanying text.
243 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5-104 (West 2016) ("On a finding by the court that a claim
brought under this chapter applying to illegal, fraudulent or unconscionable conduct or any
prohibited debt collection practice was brought in bad faith and for the purposes of harassment, the
court may award to the defendant reasonable attorney fees.").
[Vol. 119
32
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss2/13
TIGHTENING THE LOOPHOLE
a faceless body in thousands of potential complaints logged with the CFPB.244
While the CFPB's current complaint resolution process is adequate, it does not
provide the same immediate, adversarial relief as strong consumer statutes.
Also, unfortunately, there appear to be no numbers, which indicate the
impact that consumer protection statutes with fee-shifting provisions had on the
mortgage industry. But the presence of consumer activist law firms dedicated to
this very issue and funded through this very way is sufficient to indicate that the
effect is not negligible. While some may argue that the effort needed to create,
maintain, and amend consumer protection statutes to cover student loan
borrowers and servicing complaints is greatly outweighed by the potential
benefits, such critics should be reminded of two facts: there are 40 million
student loan borrowers in the United States,"' and those borrowers have
undertaken a burden, in hopes of individual success, that Congress has exempted
from the "fresh start" relief of bankruptcy discharge.246
III. CONCLUSION
As this Note has shown, the high bar that accompanies student loan
discharge in bankruptcy creates a vulnerable population of student loan
borrowers that are susceptible to frustrating and costly loan servicing errors.
While regulators are investigating ways to increase protections through increased
oversight, these provisions will not provide adequate individual relief. By
identifying the successes of the mortgage servicing reforms, including fee-
shifting provisions in consumer protection statutes, it is clear that to completely
protect borrowers, consumer protection statutes must be expanded to include
student loan borrowers, must include strong fee-shifting provisions, and must be
broadly interpreted by courts.
Denise Bronson 247 was part of the lucky (or most unlucky) few; her
circumstances were so unfortunate that to prevent her from having a "fresh start"
would be to impose an undue burden which would unconscionably reduce her
standard of living. Denise's student loan debt was discharged. For a majority of
student borrowers, however, student loan debt is real and, regardless of how
individual careers play out, lasting. Because of this, student loan servicers must
be held to the strictest of standards in servicing, and must be quickly and
efficiently policed when their activities fall below that standard. To protect the
244 The CFPB reports that in 2015 approximately 7,500 student loan complaints were received,
and 60% of those complaints were about servicers, including getting information about accounts
and making payments. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 34 (2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/20151 lc fpb-semi-annual-report-fall-2015 .pdf.
245 CFPB Launches Public Inquiry, supra note 17.
246 See Zackerman, supra note 57, at 691.
247 See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text for Denise Bronsdon's story.
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24840 million student loan borrowers, any loopholes must be tightened. To protect
borrowers, state consumer protection statutes must include fee-shifting
provisions whereby borrowers can enforce high servicing standards and engage
immediate and adequate relief.
Katheryn E. Marcum*
248 CFPB Launches Public Inquiry, supra note 17.
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